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Abstract
We study the decision entrepreneurs face in …nancing multiple and indepen-
dent projects. If strategic defaults are assessed likely to occur, for example
if judicial e¢ciency is low, entrepreneurs delay projects to seek sequential
…nancing from a relationship lender. Such commitment-type borrowing al-
lows the entrepreneur to build a private reputation for repayment and conse-
quently reduces the cost of …nancing. However, if the ex-ante risk of strategic
default in the economy is low, the bene…ts of building a private reputation
are outweighed by the holdup rents extractable by the incumbent …nancier.
In this environment, entrepreneurs choose to …nance all projects at once from
single or multiple, arm’s-length lenders.
JEL code: G21
Keywords: project sequencing, reputation building, relationship …nancing,
contract enforcement, judicial e¢ciency
1 Introduction
Previous theory teaches us that close and repeated …nancing, such as that
provided by banks, is most important to so-called “informationally-opaque”
borrowers. According to theory, these borrowers - typically small, young
…rms with no public track record - value this relationship-based lending
because they are unable to credibly communicate their repayment ability
to a wider set of “arm’s-length” lenders. In reality, many informationally-
transparent …rms also rely on some form of relationship-based …nancing. For
instance, Houston and James (2000) report that relatively large, publicly-
traded …rms obtain an average of 67% of their debt from banks and only
16% from public issues. Ongena and Smith (2000a) show that large, estab-
lished publicly-traded …rms actually maintain longer bank relationships than
small, young publicly-traded …rms. In this paper, we provide a rationale for
why all types of …rms may at times prefer relationship-based …nancing. In
particular, we study the decision …rms face in …nancing multiple independent
investment projects.
In our model, an entrepreneur determines the sequencing for investment
in two projects according to the availability and cost of funds. The en-
trepreneur can either try to …nance both projects up front or sequence the
…nancing and investment over two periods. The entrepreneur also decides
whether to …nance the projects using one or multiple lenders. A lender bases
its …nancing decision on the perceived likelihood that an entrepreneur will
strategically default on a loan, and its ability to extract holdup rents. We
assume that some entrepreneurs are “good”, in that they never default on a
loan, while others are “bad” in the sense that they will always default when
it pays to do so. Lenders cannot observe an entrepreneur’s default type, but
know the unconditional likelihood of facing a bad borrower. We show that
…rms operating in an environment where strategic defaults are likely choose
to have their projects sequentially …nanced by the same lender. We term this
behavior “relationship …nancing”. The intuition for this result is straightfor-
ward. The relationship lender observes individual loan repayments in the …rst
period, which increases the ex-ante likelihood of repayment in both periods.
The resulting decrease in the interest rate charged to the entrepreneur seek-
ing to …nance the sequenced projects more than o¤sets holdup rents accruing
to the incumbent lender.
Our model illustrates that even in cases of severe holdup, relationship
…nancing may still be preferable to arm’s-length …nancing if the assessed
1
likelihood of repayment is su¢ciently low. However, relationship …nancing is
not always optimal. If the ex-ante risk of strategic default in the economy is
low, then the bene…ts of building a reputation are outweighed by the holdup
rents extractable by the relationship lender. In this environment, …rms choose
to …nance both projects upfront either from a single lender or from multiple
lenders. We term this, as well as the opportunity to sequence projects using
multiple lenders, “arm’s- length …nancing”.
The main contributions of our paper are two-fold. First, we demonstrate
that relationship …nancing can arise endogenously, even when …rms have
equal access to arm’s-length …nancing and banks are able to extract holdup
rents. In our model, all entrepreneurs start with the opportunity for …nanc-
ing their projects with arm’s length securities and then choose whether or not
to invest in a relationship. Second, we link capital budgeting concepts like
project timing to …nancing method. Our model provides a rationale for why
entrepreneurs may optimally choose to delay …nancing a project even when
there is no uncertainty about project payo¤s or discount rates (Dixit and
Pindyk, 1994; Berk, 1999), nor a need to monitor progress through stages
of …nancing (Gompers, 1995). Firms sequence projects when reputational
gains from paying o¤ early projects reduce future lending costs. Because a
reputation for repayment can only be gained by borrowing from the same
lender, when …rms choose to sequence projects, they do so through relation-
ship …nancing.
Our theoretical framework also has several more speci…c applications.
For instance, our model embodies characteristics of a revolving line of credit.
Lines of credit are capped, forcing …rms to repay their drawn credit before
…nancing new projects. A pattern of drawdowns and repayments enables a
…rm to build a reputation for repayment with its bank. Given this interpre-
tation, our model implies that …rms should opt for lines of credit …nancing
with a low credit limit over a large term loan when operating in an environ-
ment where strategic default is likely. On the other hand, large term loans
should be preferred in settings where strategic default is unlikely. By assign-
ing more meaning to our strategic default parameter, we can also gain insight
into cross-sectional di¤erences in …nancing behavior. For instance, if a coun-
try’s legal system can reduce the incentive for …rms to strategically default,
then our model also suggests that relationship …nancing will be more preva-
lent in countries with weaker contract enforcement and less e¢cient judicial
systems. We expand these interpretations later in the paper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We discuss associations
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with the related literature in Section 2. Section 3 introduces the model. In
Section 4, we explore the characteristics of arm’s-length …nancing, while in
Section 5 we focus on relationship …nancing. Section 6 describes the possible
equilibria and Section 7 introduces extensions to the model. In Section 8, we
explore di¤erent applications of the model, and Section 9 concludes.
2 Related Literature
2.1 Bank Relationships
Our paper is most closely related to the literature exploring the value of bank
relationships. These papers are predicated on the idea that banks, as “inside”
lenders, can observe and monitor borrowers in a way that allows them to …-
nance …rms that are otherwise unable to obtain valuable …nancing. Banks, it
is argued, enjoy scale and scope economies in …nancing such informationally-
opaque borrowers, and can therefore improve borrower welfare.1 However,
the ability for a bank to privately observe proprietary information and main-
tain a close relationship with customers may create a holdup problem, in the
sense that the bank can use its information monopoly to extract above cost
rents from its good borrowers.2.
We di¤er from this extant literature along several dimensions. First, al-
though information asymmetries exist between lenders and borrowers in our
model, the asymmetry itself does not in‡uence the choice between relation-
ship and arm’s length …nancing. Therefore, our model moves away from
relating the value of bank …nancing to whether or not a …rm is informa-
tionally opaque. Second, rather than assume that …rms require repeated
…nancing through time, we allow …rms the choice between repeated lending
and one-shot …nancing and derive conditions under which repeated …nanc-
ing with one bank is optimal. Third, by assuming that entrepreneurs have
multiple projects to …nance, we are able to relate the timing and sequencing
of projects to …nancing choice. This provides a novel approach to thinking
about some common capital budgeting issues.
1Fr instance, see Campbell (1979), Diamond (1984, 1991), Fama (1985), Rajan (1992),
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984), Sharpe (1990), and von Thadden (1995). For formal
reviews of this literature, see Boot (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000b).
2The holdup problem is explored by Fischer (1990), Greenbaum, Kanatas, and Venezia
(1989), Rajan (1992), Sharpe (1990), and von Thadden (1998).
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2.2 Reputation
Because we focus on the in‡uence of borrower reputation on …nancing choice,
our paper also shares similarities with Diamond (1991). In Diamond’s model,
borrowers always borrow repeatedly, taking into account the impact of cur-
rent actions on their future reputation, which is publicly observable. In his
model, only high-rated borrowers with a good reputation receive arm’s-length
…nancing. In contrast, in our stylized framework an entrepreneur chooses
whether or not to borrow repeatedly depending on the assessed likelihood
of repayment to build a privately-observed track record (the repayment his-
tory is private information and cannot be reported credibly by an incumbent
bank). Hence our setup highlights the trade-o¤ between building a privately-
observable reputation and an ex post monopoly relationship between the en-
trepreneur and the bank (rather than a …rm-speci…c track record known to
the entire banking sector and perfect competition) to explain the …rm’s choice
between single-shot arm’s-length …nancing and relationship …nancing.
Like our paper, Boot and Thakor (1994) also model repeated borrowing.
They show that even without learning or risk aversion, bank-borrower rela-
tionships are welfare enhancing and bene…t the borrower. Borrowers in their
model commit to a long-term contract that requires paying an above-market
borrowing rate and committing collateral until a good project outcome is re-
alized, then paying an in…nite stream of below market rates with no collateral
requirements after the realization. Hence in their model durable relationships
permit long-term contracting and e¢cient intertemporal taxation and sub-
sidization to reduce the use of costly collateral. In contrast, in our model
durable relationships enhance e¢ciency by enabling …nancing of sequenced
projects in cases where …nancing of all projects at once can not take place.
2.3 Relationship and Arm’s-Length Lending
Our modeling is further related to the literature exploring the contrast be-
tween relationship and arm’s length lending. Rajan (1992) for example argues
that relationship lending is bene…cial because a relationship bank’s threat to
withdraw funding induces …rm managers to accept positive net present value
projects. In Boot and Thakor (2000) banks determine the allocation of their
lending capacity across relationship and arm’s-length or “transaction” lend-
ing. Relationship lending is assumed to result in a higher probability of
non-zero payo¤s for the borrowers’ projects and is further assumed to be
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increasing in the degree of the banks’ sector specialization. Boot and Thakor
show that an increase in interbank competition increases relationship lending
but decreases the banks’ sector specialization, while increased capital mar-
ket competition reduces relationship lending but increases the banks’ sector
specialization.
Das and Nanda (1999) also analyze bank specialization by analyzing the
trade-o¤ between o¤ering commercial and investment banking services. In
their model, commercial banking activities entail long term relationships with
ex-post payo¤s for the bank resulting in low levels of bank specialization. In-
vestment banking activities go hand in hand with short term relationships
and ex-ante payo¤s causing ‘too high’ levels of specialization. In contrast to
both Boot/Thakor and Das/Nanda, we focus on the entrepreneur’s …nanc-
ing decision and show that …nancing relationships may arise endogenously,
result in a higher probability of repayment, and hence assuage asymmetric
information problems.
2.4 Project Timing
Because we link project timing to …nancing method, our setup is further re-
lated to work focusing on the option value of waiting to invest and optimal
contracting under uncertainty. For example, entrepreneurs may optimally
choose to delay …nancing a project when there is uncertainty about invest-
ment returns or discount rates (Dixit and Pindyk, 1994; Berk, 1999). Staged
…nancing of a single entrepreneurial venture may further be optimal if there
is a need to monitor its progress (Sahlman, 1990; Gompers, 1995).
While Admati and P‡eiderer (1994) derive the optimality of a …xed-
fraction contract under uncertainty in a multistage setting, Bergemann and
Hege (1998) show that a time-varying share contract is optimal in a more
general, dynamic agency model. The optimality of staging itself and the
optimal number of stages is derived in Neher (1999). In his model, staging
investment in a single project mitigates the commitment problem of the en-
trepreneur not to renegotiate down the investor’s claim once the investment
is sunk.
Complementing these papers, our model considers multiple projects and
provides an additional rationale for why entrepreneurs may optimally choose
to delay …nancing a project. In our model entrepreneurs sequence projects




An entrepreneur has access to two independent projects A and B. Both
projects require an initial investment k and yield certain payo¤s ¼A and
¼B. Both payo¤s exceed the initial investment k.3 The entrepreneur can
either realize both projects simultaneously (henceforth, ‘joint projects’) or
delay one project and in e¤ect pursue the projects sequentially (henceforth,
‘sequential projects’). In the latter case the entrepreneur can start with
either project A or project B: Without loss of generality, we assume that
¼A > ¼B: To ease notation, let ¢ = 2k=(¼A+ ¼B) and ¢j = k=¼j, j = A;B,
be the inverse pro…tability measures for the joint and sequential projects
respectively. Notice that by de…nition ¢A < ¢ < ¢B:
We assume that the entrepreneur has no initial wealth, hence she has to
seek outside …nancing from one or two lenders. Each project is nondivisi-
ble, so the entrepreneur must borrow the entire amount for a project from
one lender. She also has no mechanism for storing excess cash, so that all
…nancing must me done just prior to investment. In other words, if the
entrepreneur chooses to sequence the projects, she must also sequence her
…nancing. Moreover, if the projects are sequenced, the entrepreneur con-
sumes all surplus from the project payo¤ at the end of period 1, such that
she …nances the entire period 2 project from outside sources.4 As part of the
…nancing decision, the entrepreneur must also choose whether to borrow from
one lender or two. If the borrower chooses to …nance sequential projects from
one lender, we label it “relationship …nancing” since the lender learns from
the entrepreneur’s …rst period behavior. We label as “arm’s-length …nanc-
ing” the funding of the two projects in one shot in the …rst period (through
either one or two lenders) and sequential funding by two di¤erent lenders.
In the beginning of a relationship, the entrepreneur has full bargaining
power. However, we assume that the lender acquires full bargaining power
in the second period of relationship …nancing. The entrepreneur retains full
bargaining power if she switches lenders in the second period. Switching
lender does not entail any direct costs, but the new lender does not know the
repayment history of the entrepreneur, and the incumbent lender is not able
to report it credibly to the new lender.
3 In a somewhat related setup, Aerni and Egli (2000) start with di¤erent investment
sizes to study progressive lending in micro…nance programs.
4This assumption is not restrictive. We will discuss the issue of retained earnings in
the concluding section.
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Lenders are uncertain whether or not repayment, rt; with t = 1; 2, will
occur. With an initial probability p0 2 (0; 1], the entrepreneur is good, and
will always repay any amount up to the project payo¤. With probability
1 ¡ p0; the entrepreneur is bad and has the option to strategically default.
She will exercise the option if this is optimal for her to do so. We assume that
the lenders cannot recuperate any positive payment when a bad entrepreneur
decides to default. Moreover a bad entrepreneur cannot precommit to a
positive level of repayment.
The entrepreneur knows her own type, whereas the lenders do not. Ini-
tially, the lenders only know the prior probability p0: In case the projects are
sequenced, the lender that …nances the …rst project also knows whether the
entrepreneur pays r1. Denote ¯ 2 [0; 1] to be the (endogenously determined)
probability that a bad entrepreneur pays r1: Given ¯; the lender can deduce
the total probability q = p0 + ¯(1 ¡ p0) of receiving the payment r1: Given
that r1 is paid, the lender updates its prior belief, p0; that the entrepreneur
is good using Bayes’ rule, i.e. p1 = p0=q:
Both the entrepreneur and the lenders maximize their expected income,
with ½ as discount factor of the entrepreneur. In order to facilitate the formal
exposition, we assume that ½ >
p
¢B: This assumption requires either that
project B be quite pro…table or that the entrepreneur does not discount the
future by very much.
This completes the description of the game setup. We proceed as fol-
lows. We investigate the cases of arm’s length and relationship …nancing
separately. We fully describe the equilibrium outcome for each of the two
cases. Next we analyze the entrepreneur’s choice to sequence projects and
to switch lenders after period 1. The lenders anticipating the entrepreneur’s
choice may structure contracts accordingly.
4 Arm’s Length Financing
If the entrepreneur seeks to …nance joint projects simultaneously, she pro-
poses a contract specifying the investment amount 2k and the repayment level
r: Obviously, a bad entrepreneur never repays r as she is always better o¤ re-
pudiating. The good entrepreneur paysminfr; ¼A+¼Bg by assumption. The
risk of repudiation in‡uences negotiations at the beginning of the game. A
lender anticipates a breach of contract with probability 1¡p0: Hence a lender
is only willing to sign a contract under which its expected repayment under
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the best of circumstances p0r at least covers investment 2k; i.e. r ¸ 2k=p0:
On the other hand, it is known that any repayment r exceeding ¼A + ¼B is
impossible since the entrepreneur has no initial wealth, i.e. r  ¼A + ¼B:
The two constraints are compatible if and only if p0 ¸ 2k=(¼A+ ¼B) = ¢: If
this is the case, the good entrepreneur o¤ers a repayment r = 2k=p0 which
makes the lender indi¤erent between signing and rejecting and maximizes
the entrepreneur’s income ¼A + ¼B ¡ r. A bad entrepreneur is forced to
imitate the behavior of a good entrepreneur. As a bad entrepreneur always
wants to default, a rational lender never signs a contract once it is clear the
entrepreneur is bad. Aware of this intention, a bad entrepreneur will conceal
her intentions in contract negotiations by mimicking the behavior of a good
entrepreneur.
Denote °¤ 2 [0; 1] be the probability with which the lender accepts the






= 0 if r < 2k=p0;
2 [0; 1] if r = 2k=p0 and p0 = ¢;
= 1 if r ¸ 2k=p0 and p0 >¢:
(1)
The lender rejects if r < 2k=p0. On the other hand, the lender accepts
if r > 2k=p0. For r = 2k=p0 and p0 > ¢, the lender accepts with certainty.
There is no equilibrium pro…le under which it rejects with positive proba-
bility, because the entrepreneur would then propose a repayment r slightly
above 2k=p0, so that no best response for the lender exists. For r = 2k=p0
and p0 = ¢, any °¤ 2 [0; 1] represents a best response for the lender, since
the only acceptable repayment leading to a nonnegative income for the en-
trepreneur is r = 2k=p0.
We assumed that the entrepreneur has full bargaining power in both
periods under arm’s-length …nancing and that the ‘repayment history’ of the
entrepreneur is only known by the …rst lender. It is important to note that,
in the second period, the outside lenders cannot learn from the fact that the
entrepreneur is seeking …nancing from them. To put it di¤erently, the outside
lenders are not exposed to a Winner’s Curse problem. The reason for this
5For a sequential equilibrium to exist in the two-period case, it may be necessary that
a second-period contract is randomly signed. In general, it is possible for the entrepreneur
to randomize in equilibrium between proposing a contract promising zero expected income
and proposing a contract leading to a certain rejection. Alternatively, when indi¤erent
between accepting and rejecting, a bank may randomize in equilibrium. We can assume
that in these cases the entrepreneur proposes a contract with certainty.
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is that lenders are able to compute a good entrepreneur’s optimal choice of
…nancing scheme. A bad entrepreneur pursuing a di¤erent strategy than a
good entrepreneur is immediately revealed. Therefore, a bad entrepreneur
only chooses to switch after period 1 when it is also in the interest of a good
entrepreneur to do so. Since the outside lenders do not know the repayment
history of the entrepreneur, they expect to be faced with a good entrepreneur
with probability p0: Therefore, the two periods are structurally identical, and
we can directly apply the analysis derived above. The results are summarized
in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Arm’s-Length Financing:
(i) Joint projects: If p0 ¸ ¢; the entrepreneur, either good or bad, proposes
a repayment r¤ = 2k=p0 in exchange for an investment 2k in equilib-
rium, and the lender accepts. The bad entrepreneur defaults on r with
certainty. If p0 < ¢; no contract is signed.
(ii) Sequential projects: If p0 ¸ ¢j; j = A;B; the entrepreneur, either good
or bad, proposes repayment r¤ = k=p0 in exchange for investment k,
and the lender accepts. A bad entrepreneur defaults with certainty. If
p0 < ¢j; no contract is signed.
The entrepreneur, is able to …nance the sequential projects if and only
if p0 ¸ ¢B: For ¢A  p0 < ¢B; she can only …nance the more pro…table
project A: In that case, due to discounting, she chooses to realize project A
in the …rst period. Also due to discounting and the fact that the repayment
is independent from the project choice, she realizes project A before project




¼A + ¼B ¡ 2k=p0 if p0 ¸¢






¼A ¡ k=p0 + ½(¼B ¡ k=p0) if p0 ¸¢B
¼A ¡ k=p0 if ¢B > p0 ¸ ¢A
0 if p0 <¢A
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Comparing pro…ts, it becomes clear that the entrepreneur always chooses
to realize both projects jointly if the lender is willing to …nance such engage-
ment. As ¢ < ¢B, the entrepreneur always undertakes joint projects if the
lender is willing to fund. This result is summarized in Corollary 2.
Corollary 2 Under arm’s-length …nancing, joint projects are realized when-
ever p0 ¸ ¢: For ¢ > p0 ¸ ¢A; only project A is realized in the …rst
period, and there is no additional …nancing provided in the second period.
For p0 < ¢A; no …nancing takes place at all.
5 Relationship Financing
The main di¤erence between arm’s-length and relationship …nancing is that
the repayment behavior of the bad entrepreneur at the end of period 1 will
play an important role. As the ensuing analysis will show, there are four types
of possible equilibria. We de…ne a ‘reputational equilibrium’ as a sequential
equilibrium in which the bad entrepreneur pays r1 with probability ¯ 2 (0; 1).
In contrast, we de…ne an equilibrium in which the bad entrepreneur always
defaults (¯ = 0) as a ‘separating equilibrium’, and an equilibrium in which
the bad entrepreneur never defaults (¯ = 1) as a ‘pooling equilibrium’. Equi-
libria in which no project is …nanced are labelled ‘no investment equilibria’.
We solve the model by backwards induction. Applying Proposition 1 to
the second period gives us a complete description of the equilibrium in the
second period.
Corollary 3 Suppose no project has been carried out in the …rst period. If
p0 ¸ ¢A; the lender proposes repayment r¤2 = ¼A in exchange for investment
k; and the entrepreneur accepts. The bad entrepreneur defaults on r¤2 with
certainty. If p0 < ¢A; no second-period contract is signed.
Corollary 4 Suppose project i has been carried out in the …rst period. If
r1 has been repaid and p1 ¸ ¢j, the lender proposes with probability °¤ a




2 [0; 1] if r2 = k=p1 and p1 = ¢j;
= 1 if r2 ¸ k=p1 and p1 >¢j:
The bad entrepreneur defaults on r¤2 with certainty. If repayment r1 has not
been paid or p1 < ¢j; no second-period contract is signed.
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We now turn to the end of period 1. Suppose project i has been …nanced
and realized, and repayment r1 is due. Anticipating the outcome of the sec-
ond period (Corollaries 3 and 4), a bad entrepreneur knows that she collects
the payo¤ of project j with present value ½¼j in case she pays r1 with prob-
ability ¯ such that p1 ¸ ¢j: Obviously, she is better o¤ defaulting when the
costs r1 of ‘building up a reputation’ exceed the potential gain ½¼j of having
the reputation, i.e. in equilibrium, ¯¤ = 0, r1 > ½¼j:
In contrast, for r1  ½¼j; a bad entrepreneur will choose ¯ as high as
possible in order to maximize the probability to collect the reputational rent
½¼j ¡ r1: For p0 ¸ ¢j, she can choose ¯ = 1 without risking to loose the
second-period contract. For p0 < ¢j, she can maximally choose:






implying p1 = ¢j, and according to Corollary 4, ¯¤ = ¯ successfully induces
a second-period contract with probability °¤ 2 [0; 1]. For ¯¤ = ¯ to be an
equilibrium, the bad entrepreneur must be indi¤erent between ¯¤ and any
other ¯ increasing her reputational rent based on initial beliefs ¯¤.6 Hence
in equilibrium, the expected reputational rent °¤½¼j ¡ r1 must be equal to
zero implying °¤ = r1=(½¼j). The results are summarized in
Lemma 5 Suppose project i has been …nanced. When repayment r1 is due
and r1  ½¼j; a bad entrepreneur repays with probability ¯¤ = minf¯; 1g
where ¯ is given by (2). For ¯¤ = ¯ < 1, a second-period contract for project
j is induced with probability °¤ = r1=(½¼j). If r1 > ½¼j; a bad entrepreneur
defaults, i.e. ¯¤ = 0:





1 if r1  ½¼j and p0 ¸ ¢j;
p0=¢j if r1  ½¼j and p0 < ¢j;
p0 if r1 > ½¼j;
(3)
and the updated equilibrium beliefs of the lenders about the proportion








p0 if r1  ½¼j and p0 ¸ ¢j;
¢j if r1  ½¼j and p0 < ¢j;
1 if r1 > ½¼j:
(4)
6Given small non-transferable private bene…ts of running projects she will choose ¯¤ =
¯.
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Note that p¤1 is never less than ¢j: Let us now turn to the contracting
problem at the beginning of period 1. Anticipating q¤, the lender expects a
repayment of q¤r1: To cover its investment k; it only accepts a contracted
repayment equal to:
r1 ¸ k=q¤: (5)
On the other hand, it also knows that any repayment promise r1 exceeding
¼i is impossible as entrepreneurs have no initial wealth, hence:
r1  ¼i: (6)
We now derive conditions for a reputational equilibrium, i.e. an equi-
librium in which ¯¤ 2 (0; 1): According to Lemma 5, a positive repayment
probability less than 1 implies ¯¤ = ¯ and is only possible if the reputational
rent is nonnegative, hence:
r1  ½¼j; (7)
and if the choice of ¯¤ matters, p0 < ¢j. Taking (3) into account, in-
equalities (5), (6) and (7) are compatible if and only if:












Combined with p0 < ¢j, the former condition implies k < ½¼j:
Suppose all conditions stated so far are ful…lled. Then, if the good en-
trepreneur chooses a contract promising a repayment r1 satisfying (8), she






A bad entrepreneur is forced to mimic the good type as any other proposal
would reveal her true type. In the Appendix, it is shown that proposing
a contract promising r¤1 in exchange for investment k actually maximizes
the good entrepreneur’s income. Hence we arrive at a Lemma detailing the
Reputational Equilibrium.
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Lemma 6 Reputational Equilibrium: For ¢j > p0 ¸ maxf¢A¢B;¢2j=½g,
which implies k < ½¼j, there exists a unique reputational equilibrium in which
the entrepreneur, whether good or bad, proposes a contract promising repay-
ment r¤1 = k¢j=p0 in exchange for investment k in the …rst period, and the
lender accepts. At the end of period 1, the bad entrepreneur repays with
probability ¯¤ = ¯ 2 (0; 1):
We now derive conditions under which a pooling equilibrium exists (¯¤ =
1): The way we do this is analogous to the derivation of the reputational
equilibrium. According to Lemma 5, a repayment probability ¯¤ = 1 is only
possible if the reputational rent is nonnegative, i.e. r1  ½¼j, and if the
choice of ¯¤ does not matter, i.e. p0 ¸ ¢j. Recalling inequalities (5), (6),
(7), and taking (3) into account, we arrive at minf¼i; ½¼jg ¸ r1 ¸ k, which
is only possible if k  ½¼j.
If k  ½¼j and p0 ¸ ¢j are satis…ed, and if the good entrepreneur chooses
a contract promising a repayment r1 within the interval [k; minf¼i; ½¼jg]; she
will choose r1 as low as possible in order to maximize her income. Hence she
proposes r¤1 = k: Again, a bad entrepreneur is forced to mimic the good type
to prevent detection. In the Appendix, we show that proposing a contract
promising r¤1 actually maximizes the good entrepreneur’s income.
Lemma 7 Pooling Equilibrium: Suppose k  ½¼j and p0 ¸ ¢j: Then
there exists a unique pooling equilibrium in which the entrepreneur, whether
good or bad, proposes a contract promising repayment r¤1 = k in exchange for
investment k in the …rst period, and the lender accepts. At the end of period
1, the bad entrepreneur repays with certainty.
Next we derive conditions for a separating equilibrium to exist (¯¤ = 0):
According to Lemma 5, a repayment probability ¯¤ = 0 is only possible if
the reputational rent is negative (r1 > ½¼j): Recalling inequalities (5), (6),
and taking (3) into account, r1 must also satisfy ¼i ¸ r1 ¸ k=p0; implying
p0 ¸ ¢i: To analyze this con…guration, we consider the following two cases:
k > ½¼j and k  ½¼j.
Suppose p0 ¸ ¢i and k > ½¼j: According to Lemma 5 and inequality (5),
a bad entrepreneur will never repay r1 since r1 ¸ k=q¤ ¸ k > ½¼j: Hence
r1 must be at least k=p0: If the good entrepreneur is to choose a contract
promising repayment r1 ¸ k=p0; she will choose r1 as low as possible in order
to maximize her income. She proposes r¤1 = k=p0; and the bad entrepreneur
is forced to mimic the good type.
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Now suppose p0 ¸ ¢i and k  ½¼j: From Lemmata 6 and 7 we know that
the good entrepreneur prefers to propose a repayment r¤1 = kmaxf¢j=p0; 1g
as long as p0 ¸ maxf¢A¢B;¢2j=½g: Hence a separating equilibrium only
exists if maxf¢A¢B;¢2j=½g > p0 ¸ ¢i: This is possible for ¢2j=½ > p0 ¸ ¢i:
If that is the case, the good entrepreneur will propose r¤1 = k=p0 in order to
maximize her income, and the bad entrepreneur mimics this behavior.
Taking the Appendix into account, where we show that proposing r¤1 =
k=p0 actually maximizes the good entrepreneur’s income in both cases, we
end up with a Lemma describing the Separating Equilibrium.
Lemma 8 Separating Equilibrium: Suppose (i) k > ½¼j and p0 ¸ ¢j;
or (ii) k  ½¼j and ¢2j=½ > p0 ¸ ¢i: Then there exists a unique separating
equilibrium in which the entrepreneur, whether good or bad, proposes a con-
tract promising repayment r¤1 = k=p0 in exchange for investment k in the …rst
period, and the lender accepts. At the end of period 1, the bad entrepreneur
defaults with certainty.
To complete the analysis, we need to state the conditions under which
a equilibrium with no investment exists. This is done by summarizing the
logical counter-arguments of Lemmata 6, 7, and 8.
Lemma 9 No Investment Equilibrium: Suppose either k > ½¼j and
p0 < ¢i; or k  ½¼j and p0 < minfmaxf¢A¢B;¢2j=½g;¢ig: Then no con-
tract is signed in the …rst period.
Figure 1 illustrates the results as well as the in‡uence of the choice of
the project sequencing. Because of the assumptions ¼A > ¼B and ½ >
p
¢B;
there are only three cases we have to consider.7 Let us …rst look at the
project sequence fA;Bg: Figure 1 (i) depicts the case where the …rst period
project A is very pro…table compared to project B: For low values of p0
(¢A  p0 <¢2B=½); a Separating Equilibrium exists. Here, the second period
is of no interest for the bad entrepreneur since the …rst-period repayment is
too high (r¤1 = k¢B=p0). If ¢B > p0 ¸ ¢2B=½; this is no longer the case, and
a Reputational Equilibrium exists. In case of p0 ¸ ¢B; there is a Pooling
Equilibrium.
Decreasing ¼A while holding ¼B …x has the e¤ect that¢A gets larger than
¢2B=½: Therefore, there is no more room for a Separating Equilibrium. This
7Relaxing the assumption on the discount factor does not a¤ect the results qualitatively.
14
is shown in Figures 1 (ii) and (iii). The di¤erence between the two …gures
has no in‡uence for sequence fA;Bg:
Looking at project sequence fB;Ag; one notices the absence of a Separat-
ing Equilibrium. Due to the assumption ¼A > ¼B; the second period project
A is attractive enough for the bad entrepreneur wishing to get …nanced. For
the same reason, equilibria exist for lower ranges of p0 than for the project
sequence fA;Bg: The next Lemma 10 summarizes these results.
Lemma 10 For max(¢A¢B;¢2A=½)  p0 < min(¢A;¢2B=½); there exists a
Reputational Equilibrium for project sequence fB;Ag; and a No Investment
Equilibrium for project sequence fA;Bg:
From Lemma 10 follows that the good entrepreneur will choose project
sequence fB;Ag; whenever p0 is too low to allow for …nancing using project
sequence fA;Bg: For higher values of p0; we have to compare the pro…ts for
the good entrepreneur in order to know which project sequence is chosen in
equilibrium. For project sequence fi; jg; the pro…ts are given by




¦RF (PE; fi; jg) = ¼i ¡ k




Comparing these payo¤s allows us to formulate Lemma 11.
Lemma 11 For ¼A > ½¼2B=k and k=(¼A ¡ ¼B + k) < ¢2B=½; the good en-
trepreneur chooses project sequence fB;Ag if p0 < k=(¼A¡¼B+k) and project
sequence fA;Bg otherwise. For ¼B < ¼A  ½¼2B=k or k=(¼A ¡ ¼B + k) ¸
¢2B=½; the good entrepreneur chooses project sequence fB;Ag if p0 < ¢2B=½
and project sequence fA;Bg otherwise.
We relegate the proof of Lemma 11 to the Appendix. Combining Lem-
mata 6 to 11 allows us to fully describe the equilibrium for relationship
…nancing.
Proposition 12 Relationship Financing
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² ¼A > ½¼2B=k : There is a No Investment Equilibrium for p0 < ¢A¢B;
there is a Reputational Equilibrium with project sequence fB;Ag for
¢A¢B  p0 < ¢A; there is a Pooling Equilibrium with project sequence
fB;Ag for ¢A  p0 < k=(¼A¡ ¼B + k); there is a Separating Equilib-
rium with project sequence fA;Bg for k=(¼A ¡ ¼B + k)  p0 < ¢2B=½;
there is a Reputational Equilibrium with project sequence fA;Bg for
¢2B=½ < p0 < ¢B; and there is a Pooling Equilibrium with project
sequence fA;Bg for p0 ¸ ¢B:
² ½¼2B=k ¸ ¼A > ¼B=½ : There is a No Investment Equilibrium for
p0 <¢A¢B; there is a Reputational Equilibrium with project sequence
fB;Ag for ¢A¢B  p0 < ¢2B=½; there is a Reputational Equilibrium
with project sequence fA;Bg for ¢2B=½  p0 < ¢B; and there is a
Pooling Equilibrium with project sequence fA;Bg for p0 ¸ ¢B:
² ¼B=½ ¸ ¼A > ¼B : There is a No Investment Equilibrium for p0 <
¢2A=½; there is Reputational Equilibrium with project sequence fB;Ag
for ¢2A=½  p0 < ¢2B=½; there is a Reputational Equilibrium with
project sequence fA;Bg for ¢2B=½  p0 < ¢B; and there is a Pool-
ing Equilibrium with project sequence fA;Bg for p0 ¸ ¢B:
Hence Proposition 12 establishes a No Investment Equilibrium for values
of p0 equal to or somewhat larger than 0, a Separating and/or Reputational
Equilibrium for intermediate values of p0, and a Pooling Equilibrium for val-
ues of p0 close to or equal to 1. Border values of p0 depend on project returns
and ordering. We provide a graphical representation of this Proposition in
Figure 1.
6 Choice of Financing Method
Arm’s-length …nancing occurs when either (i) both projects are realized at
once, or (ii) the entrepreneur sequences projects and switches to another
lender at the end of the …rst period. Relationship …nancing is characterized
by sequencing projects but no switching of lender. We assume that under
arm’s-length …nancing the entrepreneur retains full bargaining power in the
second period, while under relationship …nancing the lender obtains full bar-
gaining power in the second period. Clearly, the entrepreneur switches lender
16
whenever the second period’s pro…t is positive, and an outside lender is will-
ing to …nance the second period project. Applying Proposition 1 (ii) shows
that outside lenders are willing to …nance project i whenever p0 ¸ ¢i and
that in this case the entrepreneur’s pro…t is nonnegative.
Suppose that project A has been realized in period one. The entrepreneur
gets project B …nanced from an outside lender whenever p0 ¸ ¢B: We know
from Corollary 2, that the entrepreneur does not sequence projects whenever
p0 ¸ ¢: Therefore, since ¢B > ¢; for p0 ¸ ¢B; undertaking both projects
jointly strictly dominates sequencing fA;Bg. Similarly suppose now that
project B has been realized in period one. The entrepreneur switches when-
ever p0 ¸ ¢A: Then, …nancing project B in the …rst period only takes place
if p0 ¸ ¢B: If p0 ¸ ¢B, however, it follows from Corollary 2 that the en-
trepreneur does not sequence the projects. Summarizing, we …nd that the
entrepreneur never switches lender, since, whenever it would be pro…table
for her to do so, it is even more pro…table not to sequence the projects in the
…rst place.
This limits the analysis of the entrepreneur’s choice between …nancing
joint and sequential projects. In case the entrepreneur sequences projects,
she also has to decide project sequence. From Proposition 1 (i) follows that
joint projects can be …nanced if p0 ¸ ¢: Therefore, for p0 < ¢, Proposition 12
applies. As already shown, relationship …nancing is not feasible for p0 ¸ ¢B;
since then the entrepreneur would switch the lender after period one. For
¢  p0 < ¢B; we have to compare the entrepreneur’s pro…ts. From ¢ >
k=(¼A¡ ¼B + k) and Lemma 11 follows that the good entrepreneur chooses
fA;Bg if she chooses relationship …nancing. From Lemma 7 we know that
for relationship …nancing we only need to look at the pro…ts for a Separating
and a Reputational Equilibrium. Therefore, we have to compare the pro…ts
of the entrepreneur for a Separating and a Reputational Equilibrium with
project sequence fA;Bg under relationship …nancing and the pro…t under
arm’s length …nancing with joint projects. It turns out that the entrepreneur
always chooses relationship …nancing.
Lemma 13 For ¢  p0 < ¢B; the entrepreneur sequences projects.
Proof.
1. ¦RF(SE; fA;Bg) > ¦ALF : Suppose not: ¼A ¡ k=p0  ¼A + ¼B ¡
2k=p0 () p0=¢B ¸ 1; a contradiction.
2. ¦RF(RE; fA;Bg) > ¦ALF : Suppose not: ¼A ¡ k¢B=p0  ¼A + ¼B ¡
2k=p0 () p0 ¸ ¢B(2 ¡¢B):
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From Lemma 6 follows that a reputational equilibrium only exists if p0 <
¢B: Combining the two inequalities leads to ¢B ¸ 1; a contradiction.
Proposition 14 summarizes the main result.
Proposition 14 For p0 ¸ ¢B; arm’s length …nancing emerges and the
projects are jointly …nanced in period 1. For max(¢A¢B;¢2A=½)  p0 < ¢B;
relationship …nancing emerges. For p0 < max(¢A¢B;¢2A=½); no …nancing
takes place.
This we …nd an interesting and straightforward result. Although the
entrepreneur would be able to …nance the projects jointly, for intermediate
values of p0; she chooses to sequence and to accept that the lender will collect
the entire second period surplus. The reason is that under joint project
…nancing, the repayment r = 2k=p0 rises quicker with a decreasing p0 than for
sequential project …nancing and a Reputational Equilibrium where r1+ r2 =
k¢B=p0+ ¼B; or a Separating Equilibrium where r1+ r2 = k=p0+ ¼B. Since
relationship …nancing only exists for relatively low values of p0, this e¤ect
is strong and compensates more than adequately for the loss of the entire
second period payo¤.
7 Extensions
Our stylized model shows that if the lender assesses repayment to be un-
likely, an entrepreneur will defer a project and borrow repeatedly from the
same lender in order to build a reputation for repayment. Such relationship
…nancing is chosen, even in the presence of holdup. If the likelihood of repay-
ment becomes really low, the entrepreneur may even reverse project order,
exacerbating holdup costs.
To illustrate the main ingredient of the model further, assume an en-
trepreneur has access to exactly one project in each period and hence cannot
decide to delay a project. In that case the entrepreneur picks ordering fA;Bg.
If p0 ¸ ¢B >¢A, she switches lender and the bad entrepreneur can default
both in the …rst and second period. If p0 < ¢B, the entrepreneur does
not swap lender and the bad entrepreneur repays with probability ¯¤ < 1.
Alignment fB;Ag may not be chosen. If p0 ¸ ¢A, new lenders always pro-
vide funds implying that switching is optimal. Consequently, lenders in the
…rst period only fund project B if p0 ¸ ¢B. Now, introduce immediate
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access to both projects including the option to delay. If p0 ¸ ¢B, good en-
trepreneurs tackle both projects such that bad entrepreneurs never get the
switching option. In general and even in the case of …xed project alignment
(but retaining free project access), showing up in the second period as a new
customer exposes the entrepreneur as being bad. Hence sequencing projects
and relationship …nance go hand-in-hand in our model.
This main result is robust to various model alterations and extensions.
Consider for example the case of endogenous project split up. Let ¼A +
¼B = C; a constant, and assume that the entrepreneur …xes project size
by determining the proportion ® of C to be allocated to project A and the
proportion (1 ¡ ®) allocated to project B. We have to consider only the
representative project sequence fB;Ag. For this project sequence; p0 ¸
maxf¢A¢B;¢2A=½g is a necessary condition for a Reputational Equilibrium
to exist. In case of endogenous project split the latter condition changes
to p0 ¸ maxfk2=(®(1 ¡ ®)C 2); k2=(½®2C 2): Obviously, k2=(®(1 ¡ ®)C2) is
minimized for ® = 1=2; and increases in ® for ® > 1=2: However for ¼A close
to ¼B; p0 ¸ k2=(½®2C 2) is the relevant condition (see Figure 1 (iii)), and
k2=(½®2C2) decreases in ®: Hence by increasing ®, that is by placing more
weight on the second-period project, the entrepreneur is able to broaden the
range of p0 for which …nancing is feasible. The maximum she can attain is
to set ® = ® = 1=(1 +½). Increasing ® beyond ® makes k2=(®(1¡®)C2) the
relevant condition, which, as mentioned before, increases in ®. To conclude,
endogenous project split up and an increase in total project payo¤s (C)
widens the reach of both arm’s-length and relationship …nancing versus the
No Investment outcome.
However, arms’-length …nancing may become less prevalent, if the size
of the investment in the joint projects exceeds the credit limit set for the
entrepreneur by each lender and, in addition, if the entrepreneur incurs a
…xed cost when approaching a second lender. Credit limits could be the
result of small bank size and corresponding lack of diversi…cation, and may
be self-imposed or a result of regulation.
On the other hand, introducing a …xed cost to sequencing projects may
make relationship …nancing less attractive. For example, sequencing product
development and generating a payo¤ on a partly …nished product to repay
a loan may at best be suboptimal. Revolving …nance of retail inventories
may be easier to accomplish. A reduction in the discount rate (i.e., an
increase in the discount factor ½) similarly makes project deferral less costly
and increases the reach of relationship …nancing versus the No Investment
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area. Increased bank fragility, i.e. the expectation that the relationship bank
may not be around in later periods, may make arm’s-length …nancing more
attractive.
The main intuition of the model also remains broadly intact in generaliza-
tions to multiple projects and/or multiple periods. Enabling the entrepreneur
and the …nanciers to write long-term contracts similarly does not alter the
results. We so far implicitly assumed that the entrepreneur is not able to
credibly commit to stay with the incumbent …nancier. The threat of switch-
ing in the second period disappears if she is able to commit. Hence it is
possible that the entrepreneur prefers relationship …nancing for p0 ¸ ¢B:
In order to check for this possibility, we compare pro…ts for a Pooling Equi-
librium for fA;Bg with the pro…ts for arm’s-length …nancing of the joint
projects. As ¦ALF > ¦RF(PE; fA;Bg),8 we can conclude that the writing
of long-term contracts does not alter our results.
On the other hand, introducing second period …nancing by retained earn-
ings impedes the existence of a Reputational Equilibrium because the value
of built-up reputation decreases. However, if the initial proportion of good
debtors is too low to establish a Reputational Equilibrium, the good debtor
could o¤er a contract to the second-period lender at the beginning of the
…rst period. The contract should specify the investment and a condition
that the project will proceed only in case the …rst-period lender is repaid.
The introduction of such contract re-establishes the Reputational Equilib-
rium because the bad entrepreneur is once again forced to imitate the good
debtor by proposing a similar contract.
8 Applications
8.1 Loan Commitments
Because of the similarity between relationship lending in our model and a
bank line of credit, our paper is closely related to the literature analyzing the
optimality of loan commitment lending.9 According to this literature, loan
commitments are mechanisms designed to optimally balance reputational and
8Suppose not, then ¼A + ¼B ¡ 2k=p0  ¼A ¡ k () p0  2k=(¼B + k): Combined with
p0 < 1 leads to ¼B < k; a contradiction.
9See Boot, Thakor and Udell (1987, 1991), Houston and Venkataraman (1994), Morgan
(1994), and Shockley and Thakor (1997).
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…nancial capital, to forecast future loan demand, to lower regulatory taxes, or
to exploit cost advantages in providing liquidity. Commitments can further
mitigate investment distortions and suboptimal liquidation problems, enable
borrowers to signal unobservable characteristics, and function as insurance
contracts to risk-averse borrowers.
Complementing this literature, our model aims to demonstrate why it
may be optimal to have repeated borrowing instead of one-shot …nancing. We
do so by formally showing that a …rm may opt for project delay to allow the
bank to learn from observing both drawdowns and repayments. The ensuing
but voluntary exposure to the bank’s scrutiny may render better contract
terms for the entrepreneur, even in the presence of anticipated holdup.
8.2 Contract Enforcement
Recent empirical work documents a strong positive correspondence between
judicial e¢ciency, development of …nancial intermediation, and ultimately
economic growth. For example, Levine (1999) and Levine, Loayza, and Beck
(2000) show that cross-country di¤erences in creditor rights, the quality of
contract enforcement, and accounting standards help explain cross-country
di¤erences in …nancial intermediary development.10 The component of …nan-
cial development determined by the legal and regulatory environment in turn
helps account for cross-country di¤erences in economic growth. In particu-
lar, these studies document a strong positive association between proxies for
the quality of contract enforcement in a country and the overall size of the
…nancial intermediary sector. Our model illustrates this positive association.
In our setup only bad entrepreneurs have the option not to repay. This
proportion of bad entrepreneurs may in reality directly stem from the quality
of the available contract enforcement mechanism. Stringent contract enforce-
ment leaves few entrepreneurs with the strategic option to default. Lax en-
forcement, on the other hand, creates opportunities for many entrepreneurs
never to repay.11 For example, an entrepreneur may know the local judge
1 0For example, La Porta, de Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997, 1998, 2000).
1 1Contract enforcement is not only framed by the legal environment but may also be
the outcome of political processes determining …nancial development (Rajan and Zingales,
2000). Such conjecture is implicit in Levine (1999) and Levine et al. (2000), where contract
enforcement quality is alternatively gauged by (1) the risk that a government will - and
therefore can - modify (i.e. repudiate, postpone, or reduce) a contract after it has been
signed, (2) the law and order tradition in the country (measured by the International
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or in general have enough legal skills and resources to elude, delay, and ulti-
mately derail any weak attempts at judicial enforcement. Lenders may not
know ex-ante whether or not an entrepreneur has access to such skills and
resources.
8.3 Judicial E¢ciency
A more general interpretation of the likelihood of repayment as a function of
judicial e¢ciency may also be fruitful. Relationship banking may thrive in
countries where the judicial system is weaker in apprehending and removing
‘swindlers’ from the credit market. Swindlers don’t simply ‘work’ a legal
system to avoid repayment. Swindlers are crooks and thieves, they never
repay, they disappear, are unable, or simply refuse to repay even under legal
duress and in jail.12 Banks may assess pools of entrepreneurs in countries
with weaker judicial systems to contain a high percentage of such risky, i.e.
non-repaying, borrowers. Residing in such a country, entrepreneurs may do
better delaying projects and seeking relationship-type …nancing.
Our stylized model not only links contract enforcement and judicial e¢-
ciency with decisions about project sequencing, but ultimately also with the
development of the …nancial intermediary sector and the level of investment.
Indeed, when the judicial system is e¢cient, entrepreneurs will immediately
undertake all accessible projects and engage in arm’s-length borrowing. An
ine¢cient judicial system on the other hand impels entrepreneurs to delay
projects to build a reputation for repayment. As a result, judicial ine¢ciency
may hamper current investment and reduces contemporaneous demand for
funding as entrepreneurs choose for relationship …nancing.13 Hence we iden-
tify project delay to build a private reputation for repayment as an endoge-
Country Risk Guide), or (3) an average of the latter two measures.
1 2 In Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) all entrepreneurs are bad but the …nancier can
promise a second-period loan in case the entrepreneur repays at the end of …rst period.
The second-period losses are then outweighed by the …rst-period pro…ts. In our model, we
have both good and bad entrepreneurs and contracts in both periods have to be pro…table
for the …nancier.
1 3Our framework may complement recent static models by, for example, Fabbri (2000)
and Iacovoni and Zazzaro (2000). Fabbri assumes that weak contract enforcement in-
creases the cost of repossessing collateral in case of default, while Iacovoni and Zazzaro
postulate that legal ine¢ciencies increase the banks’ screening and monitoring costs. Both
papers arrive, like ours, at demonstrating a positive link between the quality of contract
enforcement and investment.
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nously arising, ‘insidious’ cost of judicial ine¢ciency.
9 Conclusion
To conclude, the model suggests that repeated funding of sequential projects
may arise as the dominant form of …nance when many entrepreneurs are
expected not to repay. This may be the case when the quality of contract
enforcement or judicial e¢ciency is poor. In that case, many entrepreneurs
can get away with and may decide not to repay and building a reputation for
repayment constitutes a costly substitute for contract enforcement. To build
a reputation, good entrepreneurs will delay projects to seek repeated …nance
from the same bank. Hence a low ex-ante likelihood of repayment may go
hand-in-hand with project delay, reduced current investment, and possibly
a smaller relationship-oriented …nancial sector. On the other hand, a larger
arm’s-length oriented …nancial sector will facilitate investment if the ex-ante
likelihood of repayment is high.
While our stylized framework links judicial e¢ciency and the prevailing
type of …nancing, it remains silent on the precise linkage between judicial e¢-
ciency and the number of …nancing relationships. For example, Detragiache,
Garella, and Guiso (2000) and Ongena and Smith (2000c) document a neg-
ative correspondence between di¤erent proxies for judicial e¢ciency and the
occurrence of multiple bank-…rm relationships in samples containing Italian
and large European …rms respectively. Their results may suggest that in
regions where judicial e¢ciency is poor, relationship …nancing forces project
delay, in e¤ect reducing per period funding and worsening holdup. Multiple
bank arrangements may then arise to increase per period access to funding
and to abate holdup. On the other hand, in regions where judicial e¢ciency
is high, …rms can immediately …nance all currently accessible projects pos-
sibly using a single lender. Such arm’s-length …nancing is further untainted
by holdup, even when …rms would borrow repeatedly from the same bank.
However, we leave investigating these conjectures for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 6
From Proposition 12 follows that for p0 ¸ ¢A; project sequence fA;Bg
results. It was shown in the text that given ¢B > p0 ¸maxf¢A¢B;¢2B=½g
(implying k < ½¼B); repayment r¤1 = k¢B=p0 satis…es the relevant rationality
constraints (5), (6) and (7). To complete the proof, we show that promising
repayment r¤1 maximizes the good entrepreneur’s income. Recalling Corollary
4, the good entrepreneur’s income P ¤g under r
¤
1 over both periods is given by
P ¤g = ¼A ¡ k¢B=p0:
Note that given the assumptions made on p0; income P ¤g is nonnegative.
Step 1: Consider any repayment ro1 an lender is not willing to sign. Then,
according to Corollary 3, a contract over project A promising repayment
r¤2 = k=p0 is signed in the second period if p0 ¸ ¢A: For p0 < ¢A; no
contract is signed. Hence by promising ro1 in the …rst period, the good en-
trepreneur achieves income P og = maxf0; ¼A¡ k=p0g in the second period. It
is straightforward to show that P og  P ¤g .
Step 2: Any repayment promise ro1 < k¢B=p0 violates the lender’s rationality
constraint (5) since in that case qo = p0=¢B: Hence the lender rejects, and
we are back at Step 1.
Step 3: Consider any repayment ro1 such that k¢B=p0 < r
o
1(¢)  ½¼B: If the
lender accepts, it follows from equation (4) that p¤1 = ¢B; and according to
Corollary 4, a second-period contract with r2 = ¼B is induced. The good
entrepreneur’s income is then given by P og = ¼A ¡ ro1; which is less than P ¤g :
Step 4: Consider any repayment ro1 > ½¼B: If the lender accepts, Lemma
5 implies ¯¤ = 0: According to (5), this is only rational for the lender if
ro1 ¸ k=p0: If that is the case, the good entrepreneurs’s income is given by
P og = ¼A ¡ ro1 + ½(¼B ¡ k): This is at least as big as pro…t P ¤g if ro1 
k¢B=p0+ ½(¼B¡ k): But this is only compatible with the lender’s constraint
ro1 ¸ k=p0 if p0 ¸ ¢B; leading to a contradiction with the assumptions made
on p0:
Summarizing Step 1 to 4, proposing to repay r¤1 = k¢B=p0 maximizes the
good entrepreneur’s income.
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Proof of Lemma 7
The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 6. We showed in the text that
given k  ½¼B and p0 ¸¢B; repayment r¤1 = k satis…es the relevant rational-
ity constraints. To complete the proof, we show that promising repayment
r¤1 = k maximizes the good entrepreneurs’s income. Recalling Corollary 4,
the good entrepreneur’s income P ¤g under repayment r
¤
1 over both periods is
given by
P ¤g = ¼A ¡ k + ½(¼B ¡ k=p0):
Note that given the assumptions made on p0; income P ¤g is nonnegative.
Step 1: Consider any repayment ro1 the lenders are not willing to sign. Then,
according to Corollary 3, a contract promising repayment r¤2 = k=p0 is signed
in the second period if p0 ¸ ¢A: For p0 < ¢A; no contract is signed. Hence
by proposing ro1 in the …rst period, the good entrepreneur achieves income
P og = maxf0; ¼A ¡ k=p0g which is less than P ¤g :
Step 2: Any repayment promise ro1 < k violates the lenders’ rationality con-
straints (5). Hence the lenders reject, and we are back at Step 1.
Step 3: Consider any repayment ro1 such that k < r
o
1  ½¼B: the lender
accepts ro1; and from equation (4) it follows that p
¤
1 = p0: According to
Corollary 4, a second-period contract with r¤2 = k=p0 is induced. The good
entrepreneur’s income is then given by P og = ¼A ¡ro1 + ½(¼B ¡ k=p0): Since
ro1 > r
¤
1 = k; this is less than P
¤
g :
Step 4: Consider any repayment ro1 > ½¼B: If a lender accepts, Lemma 5
implies ¯¤ = 0: According to (5), this is only rational for the lender if ro1 ¸
k=p0: If that is the case, the good entrepreneur’s income is given by P og =
¼A¡ro1+½(¼B¡k): This is at least as high as pro…t P ¤g if ro1  k(1¡½)+½k=p0:
Since ro1 ¸ k=p0; this implies p0 ¸ 1; leading to a contradiction.
Steps 1 to 4 show that choosing r¤1 = k maximizes the income of the good
entrepreneur.
Proof of Lemma 8
We showed in the text that given (i) k > ½¼B and p0 ¸ ¢A; or (ii)
k  ½¼B and ¢2B=½ > p0 ¸ ¢A; repayment r¤1 = k=p0 satis…es the relevant
rationality constraints. Note that in both cases (i) and (ii), k=p0 exceeds ½¼B
since (i) k=p0 > k > ½¼B; and (ii) k=p0 > ½¼B=¢B > ½¼B: This implies that
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in both cases only separating equilibria exist. Recalling Corollary 4, the good
entrepreneur’s income P ¤g under repayment r
¤
1 over both periods is given by
P ¤g = ¼A ¡ k=p0 + ½(¼B ¡ k):
It remains to show that proposing r¤1 = k=p0 dominates the strategy to sign
no contract in the …rst period and, according to Corollary 3, a contract with
repayment r¤2 = k=p0 in the second period. Following the latter strategy, the
entrepreneur achieves an income with present value ½(¼A ¡ k=p0); which is
less than income P ¤g :
Proof of Lemma 11
² ¦RF(PE; fA;Bg) > ¦RF(PE; fB;Ag) since ¼A > ¼B:
² ¦RF(RE; fA;Bg) ¸ ¦RF(RE; fB;Ag) for p0 ¸ ¢A¢B; which, for a
RE, is always given.
² ¦RF(RE; fA;Bg) > ¦RF (PE; fB;Ag): Suppose not. This leads to
p0  k¢B=(¼A¡¼B+k): For ¼A > ½¼2B=k; a RE with sequence fA;Bg
and a PE with sequence fB;Ag only exists if p0 ¸ ¢2B=½: Combining
the inequalities leads us to ¼A  ½k=¢B+¼B¡ k: Combining this with
¼A > ½¼2B=k leads to ½ < ¢B; a contradiction. For ¼A  ½¼2B=k; a RE
with sequence fA;Bg and a PE with sequence fB;Ag only exists if p0 ¸
¢A: Combining the two inequalities leads to ¼A  (¼B ¡ k)=(1¡¢B):
Combining this with ¼A > ¼B leads to 1¡¢B < 1¡¢B; a contradiction.
² ¦RF(SE; fA;Bg) ¸ ¦RF(PE; fB;Ag) for p0 ¸ k=(¼A ¡ ¼B + k): In
addition, a SE with sequence fA;Bg only exists if p0 < ¢2B=½ (see
Lemma 8).
² All other combinations are irrelevant; see Figure 1.
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